at the conflicts level. 10 It is trite law that restitution is now no longer subsumed under the label of 'quasi-contract' 11 but is instead recognised as being a separate branch of law. 12 That much is clear; the rest is regrettably murkier. The main problem in the domestic law of restitution that also impinges at the choice of law level is the uncertainty concerning its scope and taxonomy. 13 Three different types of claims could be said to fall within the rubric of the 'law of restitution' under domestic law. First are claims relating to the conferment of a benefit on the defendant; examples being a claim for money had and received and a quantum meruit 14 claim. Second would be actions which seek to prevent a wrongdoer from profiting from his or her wrong, such as an action for an account of profits pursuant to a breach of fiduciary duty. The third potential type of claim would be founded upon property rights; for example, a claim that money paid over pursuant to a mistake is impressed with a constructive trust. The first type of claim is universally recognised as being based on the reversal of unjust enrichment. The other two, which can be referred to as restitution for wrongs and proprietary restitution respectively, have a more cloudy basis. The question is whether these two latter forms of claims are also based on the principle of unjust enrichment. 15 There are advocates on each side of the fence. 16 On the one hand, the quadrationists hold the view that restitution is only ever about reversing unjust enrichment, whilst on the other hand the multi-causalists argue that restitution can arise from a number of events, one of which is unjust enrichment. 17 So, for example, whilst quadrationists argue that the cause of action for restitution for wrongs is still unjust enrichment, 18 the multi-causalists argue that the cause of action is the wrong itself. 19 A look at how other jurisdictions handle the same issues of taxonomy and role to be played by the unjust enrichment principle might help illuminate matters. After all, the law of obligations in civil law systems has long recognised a right to restitution on the basis of unjust enrichment 20 and the American Law Institute published the Restatement of the Law of Restitution in 1937. In contrast, unjust enrichment was only recognised as being part of English law in 1991. 21 The role to be played by the unjust enrichment principle appears clearer under US law. The draft of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment classifies restitution of profits from a wrongful act as being based on unjust enrichment. 22 The draft Restatement also recognises that restitution has a role to play in vindicating a claimant's proprietary rights. 23 Therefore, proprietary remedies such as a constructive trust, 24 subrogation and equitable lien are considered to be examples of remedies preventing the unjust enrichment of the claimant.
What about our continental cousins? It used to be said that a continental lawyer might regard himself as 'entering another world' 25 when approaching the common law conceptions of restitution, but this may no longer be quite true. 26 For example, the German law of unjustified enrichment can be divided into two main categories: Leistungskondiktionen and Eingriffskondiktionen.
The former covers claims based on a transfer; for example, a loan contract that is rescinded by the bank on the grounds of fraud. 28 The latter is based on encroachment by the defendant, such as where a person lets his cattle graze in someone else's meadow. 29 One can surmise therefore that Leistungskondiktionen is analogous to the English concept of unjust enrichment by subtraction whilst Eingriffskondiktionen appears to approximate the English concept of restitution for wrongs. 30 However, in contrast with debates by English scholars as to whether restitution for wrongs is founded on the principle of unjust enrichment, it is accepted that this is so for the concept of Eingriffskondiktion.
It is usually said that civil law systems do not admit proprietary restitution. 31 Yet in a comparative survey of restitution and unjust enrichment, it was noted that 'the interrelationship between purely personal unjust enrichment claims and proprietary actions is . . . subject to many debates even within most of the legal systems under review . . ..' 32 The matter therefore may not be as clear-cut as believed. For example, if a vendor sells a painting pursuant to a void contract, title passes even if the underlying contract is defective under the German concept of Abstraktionprinzip. The vendor however can invoke ·812(1) BGB, which is the general clause pertaining to rights arising from 'unjustified enrichment' and demand restitution of the benefit conferred, that is, ownership of the painting. 33 Under French domestic law, a claimant may also pursue an action based on unjust enrichment to retain or regain title to property which is in the defendant's hands. However, the fundamental difference with the common law is that these are personal claims 34 whereas the common law conception of proprietary restitution generally involves the claimant asserting a proprietary interest. 35 On French law, it is said that 'the revesting of title to the property in the transferor merely forms the background to a personal claim based on the other party's unjust enrichment . . . The idea of a claim in rem based on the principle of unjust enrichment would strike a French lawyer as a contradiction in terms.' 36 Yet, bar situations involving insolvency, the end result in common law and civil law systems would be the 28 Zweigert and Kötz (n 26) 541. 29 33 Zweigert and Kötz (n 26) 542. 34 A ius in personam ad rem acquirendam: Gretton (n 31) 579. 35 Although there is debate as to whether that interest must be a pre-existing interest or one which arose to prevent unjust enrichment. See, eg W Swadling, 'A Claim in Restitution? ' [1996] same in most cases. Moreover, rei vindicatio claims 37 found in civil law systems import 'restitutionary' principles despite being dealt with within the law of property. 38 The important point though is that vindicatio claims are not dependent on there being some unjustified enrichment.
From the above cursory study of various domestic laws of restitution, it appears that a choice of law rule that purports to be for 'restitution' should not just seek to cover claims based on the principle of reversing unjust enrichment. It cannot be assumed that all 'restitutionary' claims will be based on the principle of unjust enrichment. In fact, given this uncertainty, it may well be that the more appropriate route is to have a choice of law rule for 'unjust enrichment' and not a choice of law rule for 'restitution'. This issue will now be examined.
B. Reasons Against a Choice of Law Rule for'Restitution'
The fact that the label 'restitution' rather than 'unjust enrichment' came to be the more popular label for this area of law in the common law world could be said to be a result of historical happenstance. It was under the label of 'restitution' that 'the first serious attempts were made to overcome the problems of misdescription and misclassification which deprived unjust enrichment of its own place on the map of that law.' 39 This attempt started in the US in the 1930s and culminated in the Restatement of Restitution. However, there is now a concerted effort to redirect attention to the core of the subject, that is, the principle of unjust enrichment. The project to replace the original Restatement of Restitution restores the full title, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, which was first proposed but eventually dropped from the official text published in 1937. The aim of this reinstatement is to emphasize 'that the subject matter encompasses an independent and coherent body of law, the law of unjust enrichment, and not simply the remedy of restitution.' 40 This brings us to the next point. Claims that are potentially discussed under the rubric of 'restitution', that is, claims to reverse unjust enrichment, claims for restitution for wrongs and claims for proprietary restitution, all have the common feature of depriving the defendant of a gain rather than compensating the claimant for loss suffered. In other words, 'restitution' is a term of art and the law of restitution can more accurately be defined as the area of law concerned with the 'award of a generic group of 37 Such as · 985 of the BGB which allows an owner who has lost possession of his property to demand the property back from the possessor. 38 remedies.' 41 When this definition is transposed onto the conflicts of law landscape, one problem is clear: choice of law rules are predicated upon causes of action, not remedies. If the law of restitution concerns remedies, then it is fallacious to speak of a choice of law rule for restitution. Remedies, according to conflicts orthodoxy, are categorized as being procedural in nature. Matters of procedure do not raise choice of law issues; they are always governed by the lex fori. 42 In contrast, 'unjust enrichment' is not usually conflated with remedies.
In addition, 'restitution' as a term of art does not appear to be confined to the common law. 43 Under French law, a party to a loan, hire or deposit contract owes the other party an obligation de restitution but these obligations are contractual in nature. 44 Another problem with the 'restitution' label for choice of law purposes stems from the uncertainty of the scope of the subject. There is a growing body of opinion 45 that argues that claims for restitution for wrongs should be characterized in accordance with the 'wrong' and governed by the law that governs the wrong. 46 The cause of action is the 'wrong' itself, albeit with a restitutionary remedy. In a similar vein, claims for proprietary restitution should be characterized as being concerned with 'property' and governed by the property choice of law rules. 47 This approach accords with the multicausalist argument that restitution for wrongs and proprietary restitution are not based on unjust enrichment.
C. Problems With and Reasons for a Choice of Law Rule for'Unjust Enrichment'
The above makes the case that having the category of 'restitution' for choice of law purposes is inappropriate. However, there are also detractors for the alternative; some argue that 'unjust enrichment' as a characterization category is not ideal either.
One of the arguments put forward is that 'unjust enrichment' is merely a principle and not a cause of action in its own right. 48 There are two ways to counteract this. First, characterization at the conflicts level is not an exact science. The 'thing' that is characterized is variously said to be the cause of action, 49 issue at stake, 50 rule of law, 51 or even a combination or variation of these at the same time. 52 If unjust enrichment is merely a principle, no doubt this will not be fatal to its forming a 'thing' that can be characterized for conflicts purposes. The flexibility inherent in the characterization process should be able to accommodate putting cases which concern the unjust enrichment principle in a 'box' together. 53 Secondly, and compellingly, it is incorrect to state that unjust enrichment is merely a principle. A cause of action can be defined as a fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right of action. 54 In order to succeed in an action for unjust enrichment, the claimant is not relying on any abstract proposition of doing justice as might be inferred from use of the word 'unjust'. 55 For example, under English law, the claimant has to prove three component elements, namely: (i) that the defendant has been enriched; (ii) that the enrichment was at the claimant's expense; (iii) that the enrichment was unjust. 56 All these elements are then defined in considerable detail and a claimant who proves these three elements is plainly relying on facts to establish his right to a remedy. 57 In fact, there have been judicial dicta referring to unjust enrichment as a cause of action. Hedley. 59 They argue that cases interpreted as being concerned with unjust enrichment can actually be accommodated within the well-established categories of contract, tort and property law. 60 Whatever the merits of this argument, the law has progressed to the point where unjust enrichment is recognized as being an independent branch of the law. Lord Steyn in Banque Financière de law Citè v Parc (Battersea) Ltd stated that 'unjust enrichment ranks next to contract and tort as part of the law of obligations. It is an independent source of rights and obligations.' 61 Other jurisdictions as well evidently adhere to this view. 62 For example, a comment found in the draft Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment affirms that the law of unjust enrichment 'is itself a source of obligations, analogous in this respect to tort or contract'. 63 Another example is the German Civil Code, whose structure clearly reveals that unjustified enrichment forms an independent category in the law of obligations alongside contracts and torts. 64 In addition, from a comparative viewpoint, 'unjust enrichment' is a term which has 'wide currency throughout Europe'. 65 The acceptance of the unjust enrichment principle in the domestic law of legal systems, not only within Europe but throughout the world, 66 in contrast with just a generalized right to restitution with different underlying bases, is a persuasive point in support of a category of 'unjust enrichment' rather than 'restitution' for conflicts purposes. Indeed, when one shifts to the choice of law level, the conclusion that unjust enrichment must be the correct label is borne out when one looks at the provisions in other countries who have generally adopted the terminology of unjust enrichment for choice of law purposes. 67 Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation thus is suitably headed 'Unjust enrichment'.
D. Conclusion on the Terminological Question
Article 10's choice of label is advantageous from the viewpoint of English lawyers as it would accord with both the quadrationist and multi-causalist camps. The quadrationists should approve as this characterization emphasises the centrality of the unjust enrichment principle within the law of restitution, whilst also appeasing the multi-causalists as they would presumably characterize restitution for wrongs in accordance with the particular wrong involved and proprietary restitution as property. Having said that, Recital 11 of the Rome II Regulation makes it clear that the concepts covered by the Regulation are subject to European autonomous meanings. This though may be difficult in view of the divergences in the domestic systems of restitution. For example, if the claim relates to the defendant using a machine belonging to the claimant, the German court would likely characterize the claim as lying in the unjust enrichment category 69 and hence within the scope of Article 10, whereas the English court, if it accepts the arguments of the multi-causalists, would characterize it in accordance with the 'wrong', that is, as a tortious claim and outside the scope of Article 10. 70 Given that the state of the English law of restitution is currently still precarious, it is all the more important that English courts take to heart Recital 11 and undertake the characterization process for restitutionary claims in a generous spirit pending guidance from the European Court of Justice. One is reminded of Briggs's counsel that:
'It is a commonplace that conceptual divisions in domestic law do not necessarily translate into the conflict of laws . . . To take a distinction which is struggling to define itself within the domestic law of restitution and then project this into the realm of choice of law may be unwise.'
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Although it may be concluded that Article 10 is labelled appropriately, this is by no means the end of the matter as far as unjust enrichment and conflicts of law is concerned. there was early resistance on the inclusion of unjust enrichment within the scope of the Rome II Regulation. The UK Government and the House of Lords' Select Committee on European Union expressed qualms about the viability of including unjust enrichment within the scope of the Rome II Regulation. 72 The latter thought that it was inadvisable to have a harmonized choice of law rule for unjust enrichment as this was an area of law which was in an 'embryonic state'. 73 The main concern was that since the law of restitution is still developing and there is no great uniformity between the substantive laws of Member States, it would be unwise and premature to attempt to harmonize the choice of law rules in this area at this point in time. 74 Indeed, the state of flux of this area of the law was acknowledged by the Commission in the Explanatory Memorandum attached to an earlier version of the proposal. 75 It was observed that:
'The difficulty is in laying down rules that are neither so precise that they cannot be applied in a Member State whose substantive law makes no distinction between the relevant hypotheses nor so general that they might be open to challenge as serving no obvious purpose.'
76
Yet, despite the real concerns mentioned above, an overview of individual Member States' unjust enrichment choice of law rules reveals a remarkable similarity across board. The same choice of law rules can be observed to crop up in different jurisdictions' formulations. 77 This suggests that although it may be a developing area of law 78 and there may be differences in the substantive detail of the various domestic laws of restitution/unjust enrichment, these factors may not be crucial at the choice of law level.
Article 10 has adopted the more popular forms of choice of law rules. It sets out choice of law rules in favour of the law governing the relationship between the parties, 79 the law of common habitual residence 80 and the law of the place of enrichment. 81 There is then a displacement rule in favour of the law of closest connection. 82 However, Article 14, which gives parties some autonomy to choose the applicable law, trumps the provisions set out in Article 10. 78 This is more true of the common law than civil law. 79 Article 10(1). 80 Article 10(2). 81 Article 10(3). 82 Article 10(4).
Each of these choice of law rules will now be examined in hierarchical order. In addition to their appropriateness, the background and possible influences of each rule will be considered.
A. The Recognition of Party Autonomy: Article 14
The concept of party autonomy has long been recognised in the field of contract. 83 This is due to the principle of freedom of contract and the desirability of increasing certainty and efficiency in international contracts. Party autonomy, however, has had a slower rise in relation to non-contractual obligations even though the advantages of recognising this concept, such as certainty, predictability and avoiding litigation just on the issue of what law governs a claim, apply for both contractual and non-contractual obligations.
In so far as unjust enrichment is concerned, a number of commentators have in the past proposed that since the restitutionary obligation is imposed by law and is not of the parties' volition, party choice should not be relevant. 84 However, the fact that the restitutionary obligation is imposed by law is not a reason to say that the parties should not have the autonomy to choose the law governing the unjust enrichment claim. As has been pointed out by Brereton, frustration of a contract is not a matter of volition but is imposed by law; yet few would suggest that frustration is not a matter to be governed by the expressly chosen law of the contract. 85 This gives the lie to the notion that obligations imposed by law cannot be governed by a law chosen by the parties.
A limited form of party autonomy is recognised in the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law. Article 128(2) allows the parties to choose the lex fori if the unjust enrichment does not relate to a relationship between the parties. In relation to tort and delict, a more generous approach was taken by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission who recommended that the parties' choice should not be restricted to the lex fori and that the choice can be made before or after the occurrence of the tort or delict. This most liberal understanding of party autonomy is not readily accepted for non-contractual obligations. While there is growing awareness that restricting party choice to the lex fori may be overly parochial, most instruments, like Article 42 of the EGBGB, restrict autonomy to a choice made after the unjust enrichment occurs. The decision to allow a post ante but not ex ante choice seems to be based on the concern to protect weaker parties. 87 However, allowing a choice only after the dispute arises is also no guarantee that the weaker party is not taken advantage of. 88 For example, unless one can be sure that a less economically advantaged party has access to the same quality of legal advice which would be available to a wealthier party, there is no reason to suppose that a stronger party who has imposed his will on the weaker party prior to the dispute will not seek to do so after the dispute arises. In fact, the stronger party will be all the more anxious to do so. The weaker party may be better off relying on the standard public policy and mandatory rule provisions commonly found in choice of law instruments for protection.
The Rome II Regulation chooses a halfway house approach. Article 14(1)(a) allows the parties to choose the applicable law after the event giving rise to the 'damage' 89 occurs. Article 14(1)(b) then provides that 'where all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity', a choice that is 'freely negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage occurred' 90 will be given effect. There are two points to note about Article 14.
91 First, the restriction to 'commercial activity' and emphasis on a 'freely negotiated' choice are aimed at safeguarding weaker parties' interests. 92 The provision probably achieves its objective as it would most clearly cover contracting parties who have later cause to sue in unjust enrichment. 93 If the contract falls within the scope of the Rome Convention, any choice made by the parties would have to pass the protectionist rules 94 88 Carruthers and Crawford, ibid 88. 89 Article 14 is a general provision covering torts/delicts and unjust enrichment claims. The word 'damage' is inappropriate for restitutionary claims as liability is not assessed in terms of 'damage', but in terms of the defendant's enrichment. A more neutral term such as 'noncontractual obligation', which would cover both torts/delicts and unjust enrichment claims, should have been substituted. 90 Note again the inappropriate use of the word 'damage'. 91 Note that Article 14(1) does not apply to unfair competition and acts restricting free competition (Article 6(4)) and infringement of intellectual property rights (Article 8(3)). 94 Such as the rules on public policy (Article 16), mandatory rules (Article 7) and specific rules on consumers (Article 5) and employees (Article 6). made to govern their contract 'safe' for use for any consequential unjust enrichment claim. The stress in Article 14 on free negotiation would help protect parties who do not have the benefit of the Rome Convention's safeguards.
Secondly, Article 14(1)(b) goes some way towards rectifying an anomaly inherent in the Commission's first draft which only allowed a choice made after, but not before, a dispute arises. However, under that first draft, an ex ante choice made to govern, say a contract between the parties, would be given effect under Article 10(1) 95 as the law governing the relationship between the parties to govern any consequential unjust enrichment claim if the contract later fails. In practical terms this means that a choice of law made before the dispute but which is not expressly stated to cover non-contractual obligations would be given effect in relation to an unjust enrichment claim, whereas an express indication in the contract that a law is chosen specifically to govern disputes arising from their transaction would not. The parties in the latter situation were being penalized for having the foresight to choose a law to govern disputes before any dispute arises. Thus the acceptance by the Commission that a choice may be made before a dispute arises is in the interest of autonomy of the parties and would avoid unnecessary litigation. In the absence of party autonomy, it is commonly accepted that the law governing the relationship should govern the action founded on unjust enrichment if the unjust enrichment claim arises out of a relationship between the parties. 97 The rationale for this is well put by Zweigert and Müller-Gindullis:
[T]he law which governs the move from the loser to the winner and which declares the shift of assets subject to its control to be unjustified is alone suitable to regulate, in addition, the necessity for and the manner of any adjustments to be made between the loser and the winner, and to pronounce on the object of the claim for unjustifiable enrichment.
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The law governing the relationship should only govern the unjust enrichment claim when the relationship is the sine qua non of the restitutionary claim. 99 For example, if A has rendered services to B pursuant to a contract 'the place where a relationship between the parties was centred, provided that the receipt of the enrichment was substantially related to the relationship' as a contact which is, 'as to most issues, is given the greatest weight in determining the state of the applicable law' (comment d, 730). 98 Zweigert and Müller-Gindullis (n 1) 11, para 20. but B refuses payment, A could rescind the contract and pursue a quantum meruit claim 100 against B. 101 The contract forms the basis upon which B is enriched and it is appropriate that the governing law of the contract governs the unjust enrichment claim. It is the law of closest connection to the claim.
The importance of there being a strong link between the relationship and the enrichment before this choice of law rule comes into play is recognized explicitly by some statutes. Article 128(1) of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law states that '[c]laims for unjust enrichment are governed by the law that governs the actual or assumed legal relationship by virtue of which the enrichment occurred.'
102 Article 38(1) of the German EGBGB also makes clear the importance of the connection between the relationship and the claim: 'Claims for unjust enrichment based on performance rendered are governed by the law applicable to the legal relationship with respect to which the performance was rendered.' 103 In contrast, the language used by Article 10(1) of the Rome II Regulation is more vague as it does not insist on a direct correlation between the relationship and the enrichment:
'If a non-contractual obligation arising out of unjust enrichment, . . ., concerns a relationship existing between the parties, . . ., that is closely connected with that unjust enrichment, it shall be governed by the law that governs that relationship.' 104 'Concerns' and 'closely connected' have been criticized as not making sufficiently clear the degree of closeness that is required between the relationship and the restitutionary obligation. 105 However, despite the potential ambiguity of the phrasing used, 106 Article 10(1) should also work to weed out claims which do not arise out of the relationship. For example, if A transfers assets to B pursuant to a void contract and B thereupon transfers the same asset to C, an argument could be made that the 'contract' between A and B is 'closely connected' to A's claim against C since but for that 'contract', C would not have been enriched. However, the wording of Article 10(1) refers to 'the relationship between the parties' so the relevant connecting factor here is the relationship between A and C, not between A and B. The putative governing law of the contract between A and B will not be relevant at all. To give another example, 107 where trust money is mistakenly paid to a third party recipient, the existence of the trust, although incidental to the main unjust 100 Or alternatively sue for breach of contract. 101 enrichment claim which may be brought against the third party, may be thought to supply the 'close connection' required by Article 10(1). But since one is concerned with the relationship between the parties to the action, and not the relationship between the parties to the trust, the law governing the latter relationship would not come into play under Article 10(1). These conclusions must be correct as the unjust enrichment claims do not have their roots in the 'contract' between A and B in the first example, or the trust in the second example.
One should therefore only rely on this choice of law rule when the relationship forms an essential component of the unjust enrichment claim and not where it merely forms the backdrop to the claim. This will have the advantage of ensuring that this choice of law rule only applies when the law governing the relationship is the law of closest connection to the claim.
There are other advantages in adopting this choice of law rule. Since the law governing the relationship would also govern matters prior to the restitutionary claim, consistency of result will be achieved by having the same law govern the restitutionary claim itself. This is because both stem from a single state of affairs. 108 In addition, it would be rational to conclude that if the parties had given any thought to the matter, they would have expected that the law governing their relationship would govern any matters arising from that relationship. Thus, the parties' legitimate expectations are preserved.
Another point that could be raised is that, to a certain extent, this choice of law rule is able to deal with the problem of uncertainty over the scope of the law of restitution and the unjust enrichment principle that was discussed above. This is done primarily by minimising characterization problems. To revert back to domestic English terminology, both quadrationists and multicausalists accept that claims arising out of a failed contract would be classed as unjust enrichment claims. Dealing with these claims at the choice of law level is straightforward-they would be governed by the governing law of the contract in accordance with this choice of law rule. However, what about the more contentious categories of restitution for wrongs 109 and proprietary restitution?
110 For example, a claim for an account of profits made due to a breach of fiduciary duty would be considered by some to be based on the reversal of unjust enrichment 111 and therefore fall within the scope of a choice of law rule for unjust enrichment. Where there is a pre-existing relationship between the parties, this choice of law rule would apply and point towards the law governing the relationship between the fiduciary and principal. 112 Others however, would class this type of claim as an example of restitution for wrongs and one which is not based on the principle of unjust enrichment. 113 In so far as the claim relates to breach of duties arising from voluntary undertakings within consensual relationships, Yeo suggests that the law governing the pre-existing relationship should also govern the claim for unauthorized profits. However, Yeo's suggestion is based on the premise that such claims are analogous to contractual claims and should thus in the first place be characterized as contractual. 114 The contract choice of law rule points towards the law governing the relationship between the parties, that is, the governing law of the contract.
115 Therefore the same result is reached irrespective of whether the claim is classed as being an unjust enrichment claim or as a contractual claim.
If we now turn towards the field of proprietary restitution, scholars such as Birks 116 and Burrows 117 argue that such claims are again based on the unjust enrichment principle. Virgo, on the other hand, thinks claims for proprietary restitution are based on the law of property and the principle of vindication of property rights. 118 If one transposes these arguments to a choice of law level, Virgo's views would lead to characterizing the claim as a property one which is governed by the property choice of law rule. So if the claimant is arguing that land in Canada is held on a constructive trust for him, Canadian law would apply as the lex situs in accordance with the property choice of law rule.
119 On Birks's and Burrows's alternative viewpoint, the claim should presumably be characterized as being an unjust enrichment claim for conflicts purposes. It is suggested that Canadian law would also be the law governing the relationship between the parties for the particular issue of whether the land is held on trust for the claimant. Even if there is, say, a contract between the two parties relating to the land that is governed by some other law, arguably, since the land is situated in Canada, Canadian law trumps the governing law of the contract because the precise issue at stake relates to title and ownership of the land. Canadian law is the law which would govern the rights and obligations of the parties towards each other vis-à-vis the land, that is, Canadian law is the law that governs the relationship between the parties on this particular issue. Thus, under either route, Canadian law arguably should end up governing the claim. 113 Virgo (n 16) 9-11, 500-525. 114 Yeo (n 46) 215-235. 115 Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention. 116 Birks (n 16) 32-38, Chapter 8.
117 Burrows (n 16) 60-75 and (n 35). 118 Virgo (n 16) 11-17, Chapter 20. 119 Nelson v Bridport (1846) 8 Beav 547. 120 On the problem of the exclusion of renvoi from the Rome II Regulation, see Section IV(C).
whether the claim is characterised as being contractual or restitutionary, proprietary or restitutionary, as the same choice of law rule would apply. In view of its myriad advantages, it is unsurprising that this choice of law rule is given primacy in Article 10 121 as Articles 10(2) and 10(3) only apply if there is no pre-existing relationship. Although there have not been as many explicit provisions in favour of the common personal law of the parties in the field of unjust enrichment as for tort, some statutes provide for the application of the law of common habitual residence in a more indirect manner. Section 221(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws lists the 'domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties' as a contact to be taken into account for choice of law for restitutionary actions and the commentary states that 'the fact that the domicil and place of business of all parties are grouped in a single state is an important factor to be considered in determining the state of the applicable law.' 125 After setting out primary choice of law rules in favour of other laws, 126 Article 41(1) of the German EGBGB provides a displacement rule in favour of the law of closest connection. 127 The fact that both parties are habitually resident in the same place at the time the causal facts took place is listed as an indication that there might be a substantially closer 121 It also finds favour in many statutory (see n 97 above) and academic formulations (Dicey, Morris and Collins's Rule 230(2)(a) (law governing the contract) (n 7) 1863, para 34R-001; Bird (n 46) 135, section 1(a) and (b); Brereton (n 85) (law governing the contract); Zweigert and Mü ller-Gindullis (n 1) 11, para 20 connection to the unjust enrichment claim than the law designated by the primary choice of law rules. 128 The explicit provision for the law of common habitual residence for claims for unjust enrichment in the Rome II Regulation is therefore an unsurprising progression of status.
It might be speculated that the rationale for this choice of law rule stems from the American governmental interest doctrine and the series of tort cases where the parties' common home state overrode the lex loci delicti.
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Babcock v Jackson
130 concerned resident New Yorkers who had an accident in Ontario. In an action by the passenger against the driver for injuries suffered during that accident, the court held that New York law had a greater interest in being applied than Ontario law. What was at issue in Babcock was the extent of the driver's liability towards her passenger. Ontario had a 'guest' statute under which a driver was not liable for injuries caused to gratuitous passengers, whilst New York had no such law. Since the parties were both from New York, the purposes of the Ontario 'guest' statute, amongst which were to protect Ontario drivers and insurance companies, were not germane; whereas New York law, New York being the place where the guest-host relationship arose and the start point and supposed end point of the trip, had a greater claim to be applied. So New York law was not applicable merely because New York was the home state of both parties; it was applicable because it was thought to provide the 'centre of gravity' for the particular issue at stake. 131 There is no mechanism for this type of sophisticated analysis under Article 10(2) of the Rome II Regulation as it merely sets out a rigid rule in favour of the law of common habitual residence outside relationship-based claims.
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The rationale for this choice of law rule therefore cannot be that the law of the common habitual residence has the closer connection to the claim 133 merely because both parties reside in that jurisdiction. Its rationale must lie in more simple and uncomplicated reasons. For one, the fact that the parties are habitually resident in the same place means that trial will likely take place there too. The convenience of the court applying its own law need hardly be stated. For another, since the parties come from the same environment, they would likely have the same or similar expectations 134 and it therefore makes sense that their common law would govern any claims arising between them. The case is said to be the starting point of the American choice of law revolution: Cheshire and North (n 84) 606. 131 It was conceded by Fuld J that the lex loci delicti might be more appropriate if the issue at stake had been whether the driver exercised due care whilst driving: 12 NY 2d 473, 483.
132 A 'centre of gravity'-based analysis would be possible under the German EGBGB since the common habitual residence of the parties is only relevant under the displacement rule of closest connection. 133 Although the rule of course has the closer connection to the parties. 134 Reimann (n 122) 1301.
Nevertheless, there are objections against a choice of law rule prefaced on the personal law of the parties. The main complaint is that it leads to fortuitous results. 135 This form of choice of law rule used to be directed towards the common nationality of the parties 136 before being expanded to encompass common residence. 137 The criticism of fortuity has credence if common nationality were to be the connecting factor; 138 however, the modern focus on the place where the parties normally reside and live means that there is the likelihood that this choice of law rule would result in a court applying its own law and protecting parties' shared expectations as mentioned above. These practical advantages outweigh the fortuity point.
Having said that, the law of common habitual residence must play second fiddle to the law governing the relationship if the enrichment arises out of a relationship between the parties. The former, for the reasons stated above, is the more appropriate choice of law rule in relationship-based cases. The hierarchy adopted in the Rome II Regulation is correct.
D. A Territorially-Based Choice of Law Rule: Article 10(3)
There has always been considerable enthusiasm for a territorially based rule for at least some, if not all, unjust enrichment claims. In earlier choice of law proposals, a territorially based choice of law rule for unjust enrichment was based on an analogy with the lex loci delicti rule for torts and the vested rights theory. 139 This analogy has been shown to be inappropriate. 140 Even though both unjust enrichment and tort involve non-consensual legal consequences attaching to factual events, 141 unjust enrichment arises by operation of law and not from acts or omissions as torts do. 142 In addition, for some multicausalists at least, unjust enrichment is not wrong-based 143 and therefore is not focused on the defendant's acts. Furthermore, the vested rights theory has now been largely discredited. 144 Nevertheless, the rejection of the vested rights theory and the tortious analogy does not mean that a territorially based rule should be summarily dismissed; other grounds can be found on which to substantiate support for such a rule. The problem is that there are three main potential loci: the place of 135 Bird (n 46) 108; Zweigert and Müller-Gindullis (n 1) 13-14, para 25. 136 eg Art 31(2) of the Polish Law on Private International Law of 12 November 1965 and earlier versions of the German EGBGB rule; see Hay (n 87) 637. 137 Hay, ibid (in relation to the German EGBGB). 138 Since one can still be a national of a country even after having long left that country. There is also the problem of dual-nationality. 139 the act giving rise to the enrichment, the place of loss, and the place of enrichment. The law of the place of loss was principally proposed by Cohen 145 and has few other supporters. There are more authorities in favour of the law of the place of the act and the law of the place of enrichment. The relevant draft provision in the Rome II Regulation vacillated between these two options. In the Commission's first draft, the choice of law provision was in favour of 'the law of the country in which the enrichment takes place.' 146 However, Wallis, the Rapporteur for the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs, argued against application of the law of the place of enrichment on the grounds that the place of enrichment could be entirely fortuitous; for example, the applicable law would then be dependent upon where a fraudster chooses to open the bank account to which monies are fraudulently paid over. 147 Instead, she advocated application of the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the unjust enrichment substantially occurred. Although the Commission indicated that it accepted this amendment, 148 Article 10(3) of the final version of Rome II seems to reinstate the Commission's first draft's preference and is worded in terms of 'the law of the country in which the unjust enrichment took place.'
149 The question to be considered is whether the better option has been chosen. 151 In addition, although the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws lists both 'the place where 145 Cohen (n 1) depends on the (inappropriate) analogy with tort, the fact that the label 'restitution' emphasises the person who has suffered the loss, and that the place of loss will seldom have only a casual connection with the transaction giving rise to the restitutionary obligation.
146 Article 9(3), COM (2003) the act conferring the benefit or enrichment was done' 152 and 'the place where the benefit or enrichment was received' 153 as factors to be taken into account when trying to determine the applicable law, the commentary reveals that priority is to be given to the latter. 154 This prevailing of the law of the place of enrichment over the law of the place of the act can be justified. A choice of law rule in favour of the law of the place of the act causing the unjust enrichment suffers from several flaws. First, it has been pointed out that liability in unjust enrichment derives from the effect of an act and not the act itself. It is the fact of enrichment which gives rise to a claim for unjust enrichment. 155 Thus, even though the act is typically one of the most significant elements of the events leading to a claim, it is not as significant an element as the defendant's enrichment. This leads to the second point, which is that since the emphasis of an action in unjust enrichment is not on the act but on the defendant's enrichment, the place of the act will not normally be closely connected with the obligation to reverse an unjust enrichment. 156 In addition, this choice of law rule would not strictly cover an obligation which arises as a result of an omission. This could possibly be circumvented as most omissions could be attributed a locus which could be considered as the counterpart of the locus of an act giving rise to the enrichment. For example, an omission to abide by certain formalities would be situated in the country where those formalities should have been observed. However, an obligation which is not based on an event or non-event is more problematic. Thus, it is not clear how contractual incapacity would work under this choice of law rule. The above has argued against adopting the law of the place of the act. Nevertheless, a choice of law rule in favour of the law of the place of enrichment is also not without its critics. Some of the criticisms are on the basis that claims for unjust enrichment commonly arise when the parties are or assume they are in a legal relationship, therefore the law governing the legal relationship is preferable as the transfer of assets would have taken place based on the relationship. 158 This can be dealt with easily; the law of the place of enrichment should be the choice of law rule where there is no prior relationship between the parties. Where there is such a relationship and the unjust enrichment claim arises from that relationship, the law governing the relationship should govern. This is the approach adopted by Article 10.
However, not all are satisfied even after confining the law of the place of enrichment to 'non-relational restitution'. 159 Although Rule 230(2)(c) of Dicey, Morris and Collins has received judicial approval, 160 the commentary notes that sub-rule 2(c) only represents a starting point for the identification of the proper law of the restitutionary obligation outside cases falling within subrules 2(a) and (b). This 'lukewarm' 161 support is also echoed by Collins J in Barros Mattos where he stated that it only a 'tentative formulation' and not to be treated as a 'free-standing rule' to be mechanically applied. 162 The unenthusiastic reception towards a law of the place of enrichment rule is rather surprising given that many of its perceived flaws can be ironed out, particularly if the definition of 'place of enrichment' is further refined. The most commonly cited disadvantages are that it may be fortuitous and have little connection with the unjust enrichment claim, 163 be difficult to identify 164 and open to manipulation by the defendant. 165 The first point can be countered: since the heart of unjust enrichment actions is the defendant's enrichment, the place of enrichment, even if fortuitous, will be one of the most appropriate connecting factors to consider as it goes to the core of the action. Moreover, it is said that:
'given that the liability is imposed on the defendant involuntarily, it is preferable to found it on a law which is connected with him; the law of the place of the defendant's enrichment is . . . closely connected with the defendant . . ..'
166
The second criticism, that the place of enrichment is difficult to identify, is particularly acute in relation to electronic transfers of funds and e-commerce transactions. When the funds have passed through more than one jurisdiction, there could be more than one potential location of enrichment. For example, if money was mistakenly transferred to A's bank account in New York, but A withdraws the money in the London branch of the bank, which is the place of enrichment? Is it the place of immediate enrichment (New York) or the place of ultimate enrichment (London)? One could look at the circumstances of each case to determine whether the place of ultimate or immediate enrichment provides the closest connection to the restitutionary obligation. decision to be made by the court would be difficult and, some would argue, arbitrary.
168
The problem with advocating the place of ultimate enrichment is that no place can be considered as the place of ultimate enrichment until the funds are settled in one jurisdiction, or the defendant withdraws the funds in a certain jurisdiction. Hwang JC gives this example:
'If the fraudster is in the process of transferring the misappropriated funds from country A to country D using countries B and C as intermediate points, what happens if the funds are attached by a court order in country C? This would not be the country of immediate benefit (which would be country B) nor the country of ultimate enrichment (which is intended to be country D) unless it could be argued that country C has become the place of ultimate enrichment by virtue of the court order. Further difficulties would arise with this latter argument if the court order in country C prevents the fraudster from receiving the funds in country C by (say) freezing them in the hands of the bank-where then would the enrichment be?' 169 It is suggested that the place of immediate enrichment would be a better option for the following reasons.
170 First, it is more easily identifiable than the place of ultimate enrichment in situations such as that described by Hwang JC, since the identification process does not hinge on any further transfers that may be instigated by the defendant. Secondly, an analogy can be drawn with other provisions. For tortious and delictual claims, Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation favours the 'law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur'. Moreover, there is Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation which gives jurisdiction to the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred in matters relating to tort. 'The place where the harmful event occurred' has been interpreted to cover the place where the direct damage occurs and not the place where indirect damage occurs. 171 Thirdly, it does appear that under English law at least, immediate enrichment would be 168 Panagopoulos (n 2) 137-138. This is also one of the reasons why Briggs, n 99 above, p. 198, rejects a place of enrichment choice of law rule: 'a rule which is based on this matter of happenstance is hard to promote. enough to found the legal cause of action. 172 Fourthly, while both the places of immediate and ultimate enrichment are subject to a risk of the third criticism listed above, namely, manipulation by one of the parties to ensure that receipt takes place in a country whose law is favourable to that party, the place of immediate enrichment is less amenable, in most cases, to manipulation. This is because the payor has to agree to send the funds to a particular place and the fraudster has to agree to receive the funds, at least initially, in that same place. This last point also illustrates that the law of the place of immediate enrichment would be less fortuitous since the initial place of transfer needs at least to be agreed upon by two parties. In contrast, if one prefers the place of ultimate enrichment, the fraudster could transfer funds from one jurisdiction to another at will and the place of ultimate enrichment could depend upon where and when the funds are withdrawn or a freezing order is obtained.
This conclusion, that the law of the place of immediate enrichment is preferable to the law of the place of ultimate enrichment, is also borne out when one looks at enrichment in e-commerce transactions. For example, how do you identify the place of enrichment if credit card details are provided to the incorrect party over the internet and payment is taken from the card? Fawcett, Harris and Bridge suggest that enrichment takes place wherever the payee's bank account is situated. So, if a French credit card company pays money into the payee's bank account in Germany, the payee is enriched in Germany and German law governs the consequential unjust enrichment claim even if the payee is resident in and ultimately withdraws the money in England. 173 Therefore, it is suggested that the final version of Article 10(3) of the Rome II Regulation goes for the correct choice of law option. The law of the place of enrichment provides a satisfactory choice of law rule for non-relational restitutionary claims. 174 Moreover, references to the law of the place of 172 In the case of electronic transfers of money, the recipient is enriched by acquiring a chose in action in the nature of a debt owed to him by the bank. This is obviously the case if title passed in the transaction, as will normally be the case with money (as title to money passes on delivery). In these circumstances, the recipient is clearly benefited by the bank's crediting of his account. Switzerland when the disputed funds were credited into his bank account there, Swiss law should straightforwardly have been identified as the applicable law of the restitutionary claim notwithstanding the defendant's residence in Nigeria or the fact that the transactions between the primary recipient and the defendant took place in Nigeria. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the cause of action would have arisen immediately once the defendant's bank account in Switzerland was credited. That said, the factual ties with Nigeria were thought to be important by Collins J and it may be Nigerian law would be of relevance in establishing the defendant's degree of knowledge. But the extent of the role to be played by Nigerian law would be something for Swiss law to decide (in the sense of establishing the threshold of knowledge and not in the sense of a renvoi by Swiss law to Nigerian law). enrichment should always be understood as referring to the law of the place of immediate enrichment. It is the rule which would do justice in most cases and there are enough reasons in its favour to be able to discard the practice of having to consider whether the place of immediate or ultimate enrichment provide the closer connection to the claim. 175 However, although it has been held that the law of the place of enrichment should govern wrongs-based claims 176 and assertions that property is held on a constructive trust, 177 it is suggested that better approaches exist for these types of claims.
178 This will be dealt with below. Most choice of law rules seek to identify a connecting factor which will point towards the law of closest connection to the claim. 180 So, for example, torts are generally thought to be most closely connected to the place where the tort occurred; hence the predominance of the lex loci delicti rule for torts. Unjust enrichment claims which arise out of a relationship are seen to be most closely connected to that relationship and therefore, as seen above, the law governing the relationship is generally accepted to be the choice of law rule for this particular situation.
Some go further and think that the law of closest connection should be the only choice of law rule for unjust enrichment claims. 181 This suggestion usually takes the form of a proper law of the restitutionary obligation. Lord Penrose in Baring Brothers v Cunninghame District Council held that first, the restitutionary obligation is governed by the proper law of that obligation and, secondly, the proper law of the obligation is the law of the country with which, in the light of the whole facts and circumstances, the critical events had their closest and most real connection.
182
A fully flexible choice of law rule however raises the problem of too much uncertainty. Indeed, most unjust enrichment choice of law frameworks are content with a displacement rule which allows courts to disregard the applicable law that is determined according to the general rules in favour of the law of closest connection in certain situations. Article 10(4) of the Rome II Regulation, like Article 41 of the German EGBGB and Article 15 of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law, is to this effect. 183 Whilst the provisions in Article 10 points towards sensible connecting factors and would, in the main, point towards the law of closest connection anyway, a displacement rule in favour of the law of closest connection forms a useful component in any unjust enrichment choice of law framework given the various permutations in which claims may arise. The problem is ensuring that courts do not invoke the displacement rule so freely that it becomes the norm rather than the exception.
Article 10(4) seeks to prevent this from happening. The standard that is required before it can be invoked appears to be very high. Article 10(4) states that the law of a country other than that pin-pointed by the prior choice of law rules applies only 'where it is clear from all the circumstances that the noncontractual obligation is manifestly more closely connected' to that other country. 184 One may wish to compare this form of words with that in Article 4(5) of the Rome Convention, which provides that the presumptions set out earlier in Article 4, which point towards the law of closest connection of the contract where the parties have made no choice of applicable law of the contract, is rebutted if 'it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country'. There have been a number of cases considering whether Article 4(5) is to be applied restrictively or liberally, with courts in different Member States not reaching any consistent interpretation. 185 However, similar litigation and disparity between the courts should be avoided for Article 10(4) as it is clear from the stronger form of words used for Article 10(4) that it should only be invoked in limited circumstances.
Having said that, the role to be played by Article 10(4) may prove to be more extensive than initially envisaged. This displacement rule may potentially be able to, on the one hand, cater to the differences of opinion between quadrationists and multi-causalists in domestic English law, and, on the other hand, help smooth over the gaps that exist between civil law and common law conceptions of unjust enrichment. This will be considered in section IV next, in the context of examining how restitution for wrongs and proprietary restitution could be dealt with under the Rome II Regulation.
F. Conclusion to Section III
The choice of law rules set out in the Rome II Regulation can be justified and will, in most cases, point towards the law of closest connection. The recognition of party autonomy and the rule in favour of the law of common habitual residence are not concerned with identifying the centre of gravity of the case, but there are persuasive practical reasons underlying these rules.
Although there is much to support about Article 10, there remain a few problems. In view of the uncertainty of the scope of restitution and the unjust enrichment principle under domestic English law, the main concern for common lawyers may be how claims for restitution for wrongs and proprietary restitution can be dealt with at the choice of law level. These topics deserve separate treatment in their own right and therefore only a brief discussion can be offered below. In particular, how such claims fit within Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation will be considered. A related issue, that of renvoi and unjust enrichment, will also be looked at.
IV. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
A. Restitution for Wrongs
Restitution for wrongs raises fraught choice of law problems. Not everyone agrees that this category is based on the principle of reversing unjust enrichment 186 and therefore whether such claims should be characterized as unjust enrichment for conflicts of law purposes and governed by the unjust enrichment choice of law rules is unclear. Having said that, some equitable wrongs have been characterised as being restitutionary and governed by the unjust enrichment choice of law rule. In El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Millett J rules; Article 4(1) sets out choice of law rules in favour of the law of the habitual residence of the characteristic performer of the contract for different categories of contracts. 188 would be applicable to knowing receipt claims, ie the law of the country where the defendant received the money. Sub-rule (2)(c) has also been considered in other knowing receipt cases such as Trustor v Smallbone.
189 In Berry Trade Ltd v Moussavi, 190 the defendant had 'laid his hands' on the claimant's goods. This was held to concern liability for usurpation under Iranian law which was recognized as being broadly analogous to the English tort of conversion or unlawful interference with goods. However, Cooke J accepted that if there had not been a tort, the claim would be governed by the law of place of receipt of proceeds, that is, Canada and England, on the basis of application of sub-rule (2)(c). 191 The obligation to pay over bribes or misappropriated money received in breach of fiduciary duty has also been held to be governed by sub-rule (2)(c). 192 Similarly, in Kuwait Oil Tanker v Al Bader (No 3), 193 Moore-Bick J applied sub-rule (2)(c) to derive the proper law of the relationship between parties when it was claimed that the defendants, who were members of the senior management of the claimant company, were unjustly enriched when they breached their duties of good faith and honesty by conspiring to steal money from the claimant. 194 In Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 6), 195 the Court of Appeal characterised a breach of confidence claim as being restitutionary and governed by the law of the country where the enrichment occurred.
196
Although the above cases seem to indicate that the law of the place of enrichment should be applicable in wrongs-based restitutionary claims, Collins J concluded after an extensive review of case law in this area that the authorities in favour of Rule 230(2)(c) were weak. 197 In fact, there are those who persuasively argue that restitution for wrongs should not be characterized as restitution or unjust enrichment. The causative event is the wrong, so characterization should instead be carried out in accordance with the underlying wrong even if the remedy is gain-based. 198 So, for example, an account of profits for the commission of a tort should be governed by the choice of law rules for tort. 199 If restitutionary damages are awarded for breach of contract then the claim should be characterized as being contractual in nature and governed by the contractual choice of law rules. 200 In the field of equitable wrongs, Yeo's important thesis fleshes out this approach of characterizing in accordance with the wrong. First of all, he convincingly argues that the distinction between law and equity is not relevant for choice of law purposes. 201 This means that equitable claims should be treated in a similar manner as all other legal claims and that any domestic classifications as to the nature of a claim only become relevant once the law of that particular country is pinpointed by the relevant choice of law rule. He then argues that claims that would be equitable wrongs under English law or analogous to equitable wrongs under English law should be characterized under the main choice of law categories like contract, tort, property or restitution. 202 For example, if there is a breach of fiduciary duties arising from a contract, then the claim should be characterized as being contractual and governed by the governing law of the contract. 203 If the duty arises from a consensual relationship not amounting to a contract, then by analogy the claim should still be characterized as being contractual. 204 If the wrong is committed by a third party assisting in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty, the claim to reverse unjust enrichment should be characterised as tortious and governed by the law governing the tort.
B. Proprietary Restitution
It has been seen above that it is unclear whether civil law systems have a form of proprietary restitution and that English domestic law has not settled the question of whether such claims are based on unjust enrichment. Constructions such as the constructive trust, however, are acknowledged to arise from unjust enrichment in certain circumstances in common law jurisdictions like the US and Canada so it is necessary to determine how claims for proprietary restitution will be dealt with, if at all, under the Rome II Regulation.
207
The first question must be whether such claims even fall within the scope of the Rome II Regulation. One might assume that since the Regulation is phrased in terms of non-contractual obligations, the natural meaning would be that its scope is limited to claims requesting personal remedies and would not cover claims requesting proprietary remedies. In fact, Article 1(2)(e) specifically excludes obligations arising from express trusts from the Regulation's scope. The initial draft of Article 1(2)(e) was more ambiguous and raised the question whether the exclusion covered claims arising from a resulting or constructive trust. 208 In her report, Wallis suggested a change of terminology from the Commission's initial draft of Article 1(2)(e) 'to avoid difficulty or confusion arising from the employment of the trust in common-law jurisdictions as a device for dealing with situations such as unjust enrichment.' 209 The Commission said that it accepted the principle of the amendment, although it preferred to adopt the wording of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition of 1 July 1985 instead of the phrasing suggested by Wallis. 210 The Hague Trusts Convention covers choice of law rules for express trusts 211 and therefore it is clear that obligations arising out of express trusts do not fall within the scope of the Rome II Regulation. However, it is less clear what is meant to fall within the scope of the Regulation by the change of terminology of Article 1(2)(e). Use of the trust as an unjust enrichment 'device' in the common law could be construed in two ways. On the one hand, there is the concept of a 'constructive trusteeship' which denotes the personal liability of a wrongdoer to account for losses caused to the principal or profits obtained from abusing a fiduciary position. Claims alleging a 'constructive trusteeship' have been held to fall within Rule 230 of Dicey, Morris and Collins.
212 On the other hand, there are the proprietary constructions of a resulting and constructive trust which some also think arise in response to unjust enrichment. 213 Which of the two (or is it both) is intended to fall within the scope of the Rome II Regulation?
The former notion of 'constructive trusteeship' would be an example of restitution for wrongs and should be dealt with as discussed above. The latter involves proprietary restitution. It is suggested that claims for proprietary restitution should really be classified as being proprietary in nature and not restitutionary or for the reversal of unjust enrichment. 214 This is because claims that property is held on a constructive or resulting trust are ultimately proprietary actions even if the cause of action is framed in terms of unjust enrichment. The claimant is pursuing an in rem claim when asserting beneficial ownership of the property. Such property cannot form part of the defendant's patrimony and would not be available to the defendant's creditors. Furthermore, once beneficial entitlement is established, the claimant would normally wish to terminate the trust and compel the defendant to transfer the property to the claimant, that is, gain absolute ownership of the property. 215 Therefore, the property choice of law rules should be applicable.
Having said that, the European Court of Justice has held that a declaration that immovable property is held on trust does not relate to a right in rem.
216
Coupled with the ambiguity over the intention behind the change of terminology of Article 1(2)(e), equitable rights such as being a beneficiary under a trust, which common lawyers would classify as being proprietary, may well be interpreted as being personal in nature and hence fall under the Regulation and within the scope of Article 10. If this happens, the choice of law rules therein should be used so as to simulate the result that would be achieved if the claim had been classified as being proprietary. In so far as the claim involves title to land and tangible movables, 217 a proprietary characterisation would lead towards application of the lex situs. Under Article 10(3), the law of the place of enrichment would probably be synonymous with the lex situs. 218 An argument has been made earlier that it might be possible to regard Article 10(1) as pointing towards the lex situs too. 219 In cases where the same law does not end up being applied under an unjust enrichment characterization as under a proprietary characterization, recourse could be had to Article 10(4).
The foremost reasons for the lex situs rule when questions of title are concerned are practicality and control: the courts of the situs have the greatest interest and ultimate power in regulating how property within its jurisdiction is transferred. 220 These justifications have the greatest force when land is concerned. However, it is important not to conflate claims in which title is affected with personal claims for restitution which are concerned in some way with land. The latter is also sometimes suggested to be governed by the lex situs. For example, Dicey, Morris and Collins's Rule 230(2)(b) states that if the obligation to restore the benefit of an enrichment obtained at another person's expense arises in connection with a transaction concerning land, the lex situs should be applied. 221 It is clear from their citation 222 of Batthyany v Walford 223 that this rule would cover personal obligations arising in connection with ownership of land. Thus, for example, a claim for the value of improvements made to someone else's land would fall under the scope of this sub-rule. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws also lists the situs of a physical thing, particularly land, as a contact pointing towards the law of the state which has the most significant relationship to an action for restitution. 224 However, the commentary notes that: 'There are still other contacts to be considered. Normally, the physical thing will have been located in the state where either the enrichment was received or the benefiting act was done.' 225 This indicates that the lex situs is not in and of itself the preferred choice of law rule with respect to unjust enrichment claims concerning land. This seems sensible as while there may be a good basis to apply the lex situs to claims involving assertions of title, as would be the situation in cases of proprietary restitution, it is more questionable whether the same choice of law rule should be applicable when the issue at stake concerns a mere personal obligation. Ruritanian law does not have a special interest in whether A is entitled to be remunerated for improving B's house, just because the house is situated in Ruritania. Neither would a Ruritanian court justifiably be offended if another law decides whether A gets remunerated. Just because land is involved should not entail a knee-jerk reaction that application of the lex situs is paramount. This applies a fortiori when the property in question is a movable.
Although it may be possible to manipulate Article 10 satisfactorily to deal with claims for proprietary restitution, two potential problems arise. First is Article 14 whereby parties are given the autonomy to choose the law governing the non-contractual obligation. Article 14 prevails over Article 10.
In proprietary claims however, it is inappropriate for parties to be able to choose the applicable law governing their claim for the reasons of practicality and control mentioned above, especially if title to land is concerned. 226 The policy reasons which may arise when proprietary restitution is concerned are not catered for by the Rome II Regulation. 227 The second problem concerns renvoi and is considered next.
C. Renvoi
below, a sensible position to take. 239 Too often, renvoi is used as an escape device or tool to enable courts to arrive at the result which they wish to achieve 240 and it is wise to limit this device only to situations where it may achieve 'the policy objectives of the particular choice of law rule'. 241 Those policy objectives raise their head when one deals with questions of title. If, as may be the case, claims for proprietary restitution fall within the scope of the Rome II Regulation, then the outright rejection of renvoi in Article 24 is problematic. On the one hand, if such claims were characterised as being unjust enrichment claims falling within the scope of the Rome II Regulation, renvoi would be excluded. On the other hand, if the claims were classed as being proprietary in nature and therefore falling outside the scope of Rome II, renvoi may be applicable. If what is at issue is title to land situated abroad, English courts would apply not just the domestic law of the lex situs but also its private international law rules.
242 If the claim is concerned with title to movables situated abroad, the authorities are weaker here but there are suggestions that renvoi would also be relevant. 243 Thus, claims for proprietary restitution may end up being decided differently depending on whether it is characterised as being a property matter or an unjust enrichment matter.
V. CONCLUSION
There was concern as to whether unjust enrichment was an appropriate area for inclusion into the Rome II Regulation. Article 10 however succeeds on most counts insofar as its choice of law rules seek to cover actions based on the unjust enrichment principle. However, the uncertainty over the scope and taxonomy of the law of restitution under the common law still poses choice of law problems. Specifically, there is the issue of whether restitution for wrongs and proprietary restitution fall within the scope of an unjust enrichment choice of law rule. It has been seen that the Rome II Regulation does not always lead to the appropriate results if these actions are considered to fall within its ambit. If the basis of restitution for wrongs and proprietary restitution were conclusively found to be the unjust enrichment principle, the unjust enrichment choice of law rules could be re-tooled to accommodate better the inclusion of such claims. However, unless and until the issue is settled at the domestic arena, problems will continue to plague at the conflicts of law level.
